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In the period from early 2000 to mid 2002, a series of incidents involving the 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) has highlighted continuing 
problems within the Force, and once again raised questions about the possibility 
of military intervention in politics. 
Recent unrest and official reviews 
Early in 2000 a group of PNGDF personnel staged an angry protest outside 
Defence headquarters in Port Moresby, demanding a 100 per cent pay rise (they 
eventually received 5 per cent). Then in September that year, on the twenty-
fifth anniversary of Papua New Guinea's independence, disgruntled soldiers of 
the PNGDF's Second Battalion, returning to Moem Barracks in Wewak to find 
there was no food in the mess, went on a rampage, burning down the regimental 
headquarters and officers' mess and causing visiting Papua New Guinean and 
Indonesian dignitaries, at Moem to celebrate the independence anniversary, to 
flee. In a separate incident the following week, soldiers marched on the Port 
Moresby General Hospital to recover the body of a colleague shot dead by 
police following an armed holdup in the national capital; rocks were thrown and 
a police vehicle set alight, and rumours that soldiers were about to march on the 
National Parliament forced the parliament to postpone its session. 
The incidents of September 2000 prompted the creation of a parliamentary 
Ministerial task Force on Defence, chaired by the Defence minister, Muki 
Taranupi, to examine the status of the PNGDF. The Task Force reported in 
October. Introducing the report into parliament, Prime Minister Mekere 
Morauta said: 'the PNGDF and the Defence Department cannot provide the 
protection that the people of Papua New Guinea need'; if hostilities or a 
national emergency occurred, he told parliament, 'a credible force could not be 
mobilised in less than 30 days'. He spoke of a 'culture of instability' in the 
PNGDF, and suggested that the institutional breakdown of the Force was the 
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res~lt of years of neglect and mismanagement. The report itself argued that the 
basic needs of the PNGDF were not being met, that basic management ' 
structures and systems were not appropriate or not working, and that critical 
issues relating to the mission and purpose, capacity, resourcing and structure of 
the Force needed to be re-examined. Prime Minister Morauta foreshadowed a 
'radical overhaul' of the PNGDF and announced that he would ask the 
Commonwealth secretary general for assistance in this. 
In November 2000 a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (CEPG), headed 
by a former New Zealand defence secretary, Gerard Hensley, arrived in Port 
Moresby to begin its review.1 At the time, there was talk of reducing force size 
fro~ 4200 t~ around 3000 at end 2000 and 1500 by mid 2001. This was broadly 
consistent with recommendations for restructuring of the PNGDF contained in 
defence white papers of 1996 and 1999. Cabinet had in fact approved proposals 
fo~ a smaller force, and a redundancy list had been drawn up (though it was 
being strongly contested). Following talks with the Australian government it 
was announced that Australia would increase its support for the PNGDF under 
the Defence Co-operation Program, in part as a once-off payment to enable the 
PNGDF to pay entitlements owed to soldiers and meet other outstanding debts, 
and cover the costs of downsizing. Australia would also provide up to thirty 
defence advisers. Assistance to the Defence Department was also anticipated 
from the World Bank. 
The report of the CEPG (CEPG 2001) was presented to the government in 
January 2001 . It contained a number of observations about structural imbalance 
~ai~te~ance and supply deficiencies, financial and personnel management, and 
d1sc1plme. It also recommended a dramatic reduction in force size, from 4150 to 
1900 within six months through a Voluntary Release Scheme. 
While the recommendation for cutting force size was not new, extracts from the 
report were leaked before adequate consultation with troops had taken place, and 
after the CEPG report had been accepted by cabinet in March 2001 rumours of 
imminent downsizing generated an angry response. There was particular 
resentment that the reconunendations had come from a predominantly 'foreign' 
group and that Australian influence was present. Within PNGDF' s main base at 
Murray Barracks - where there was already a large number of soldiers who had 
been made redundant but were still awaiting redundancy payments - a group of 
around one hundred soldiers called on the government to reject the 
recommendations of the CECP and to resign, and there were reports of soldiers 
1 
Other members of the CEPG were Major General Michael Jeffrey, an Australian former commander of the 
PNGDF. Jamaican Hugh Small QC, and senior Papua New Guinean bureaucrat Charles Lcpani. 
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breaking into the armoury. The soldiers also called for the removal of 
Australian military advisers. When the Defence minister came to address the 
soldiers he was chased away, and there was some destruction of property within 
the barracks. However, the soldiers did not carry their dispute beyond the 
barracks, despite the urgings of some national politicians, who, with an election 
on the horizon, were keen to discredit the Morauta government, and of student 
activists at the University of Papua New Guinea, who suggested that the soldiers 
join with students and trade unionists in a demonstration against the 
government's acceptance of structural adjustment measures imposed by the 
World Bank. (In a subsequent student demonstration, in June 2001, police fired 
on demonstrators, killing four people.) 
In the event, the dispute was resolved fairly quickly, but only when the prime 
minister agreed to rescind the cabinet decision on force size (though, in fact, the 
downsizing process has continued) and to grant anlllesty to those involved in the 
protest. In a public statement, Prime Minister Morauta said that the proposed 
downsizing had been shelved 'to ensure stability and avoid the issues being 
politicized' (Post-Courier 20 March 2001). 
Less than a year later another, more serious, incident occurred in Wewak, when 
rebellious soldiers, in a further protest about the proposed restructuring, took 
control of Moem Barracks, burning down the communications centre and a an 
administration block which also housed military intelligence, breaking into the 
armoury, and chasing some officers and their families out of the compound. A 
13-point petition presented by the soldiers to then opposition leader Sir Michael 
Somare (a resident of Wewak) included, as well as industrial demands, calls for 
the resignation of the prime minister, and of the commander PNGDF, and 
several other political demands, including a halt to the privatization of 
government assets and proposed land mobilization (see· The National 12 March 
2002). At the time, an editorial in The National newspaper (12 March 2002) 
warned: 'Moem mutiny threatens our democracy'; 'the main aim of the 
rebellious soldiers', it said, 'is the political overthrow of the elected government 
of the day'. On this occasion, after negotiations between the soldiers and a 
PNGDF crisis management team failed to resolve the dispute, the Barracks was 
retaken in a military operation (see The National 25, 28 March 2002) and around 
thirty soldiers were subsequently arrested and face court-martial and civil 
criminal charges. And Prime Minister Morauta reiterated his government's 
commitment to the restructuring of the PNGDF (The National 20 March 2002). 
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Background to the current disputes 
Problems of deteriorating capacity, declining morale, and poor discipline in the 
PNGDF are longstanding. They were highlighted during the Bougainville 
conflict, when the PNGDF not only was unable to contain the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army but was involved in human rights violations and occasional 
confrontation with the civilian government (see, for example, Liria 1993; May 
1997). Successive governments have failed to address the issue effectively. 
In 1988 a Defence Policy Paper proposed a ten-year programme to replace 
major equipment, reorganize force structure and enhance defence capabilities. 
Approval of a Ten-Year Development Plan for the PNGDF did not come until 
1991, however, by which time the Bougainville conflict was well under way. 
This plan provided for an expansion of the Force, to 5200 by 1995. However, in 
1992, without any explicit change in policy, the minister for Finance outlined 
budgetary proposals for the law and order sector which included a scaling down 
of PNGDF force size from 4200 to 2500-3000. For some time, these two 
mutually incompatible policy decisions co-existed without either being 
implemented. In 1996 proposals for a fundamental restructuring of the PNGDF 
were set out in a Defence white paper. These envisaged a smaller, more mobile, 
more highly trained, and better equipped force. Little immediate progress was 
made in the implementation of the 1996 proposals, which were essentially 
endorsed in a revised white paper in 1999.2 
In the meantime, the frustration of the Chan government at the PNGDF's 
inability to achieve a military solution to the Bougainville conflict had resulted 
in the decision to hire military consultants Sandline International, precipitating 
the 'Sandline affair' (see Dinnen, May and Regan 1997; Dorney 1998; 
O'Callaghan 1999). Brigadier General Singirok's defiance of the government 
over the Sandline contract received considerable popular support, and in the 
event gave impetus to the Bougainville peace process. But it also created 
divisions within the PNGDF and had pronounced negative effects in the longer 
term, both in exacerbating existing problems of instability in the office of 
commander (which changed seven times between March 1997 and October 
2001) and in increasing factionalism within the force. After 1997, factional 
splits partly followed a division between those troops who had supported 
General Singirok (particularly the Special Forces Unit which had been created 
under Singirok's command and had spearheaded the action to remove Sandline) 
and those who had not taken part in the Sandline affair (and were associated 
1 For a detailed account see May (1993). the annual reviews in Asia Pacific Security Outlook (Tokyo and New 
York: Japan Center for International Exchange), and papers by Lt. Col. James Laki, in NRI 2000a.b. 
4 
The Miiitary In Papua New Guinea: a 'culture of Instability'? 
with the Special Operations Group set up after Singirok's sacking in March 
1997 to restore order in the barracks), but were based primarily on regional 
identities. 
A particular aspect of regional factionalism within the force has been the 
growing resentment among highlanders that the highlands provinces are 
significantly underrepresented at senior officer level. 
In 1997 the PNGDF was deployed to assist police in providing security for the 
conduct of the national election. In the Eastern Highlands, however, troops 
were accused of physically assaulting supporters of the outgoing defence 
minister, Mathias !jape, and in Enga Province several soldiers were arrested on 
charges that they had assisted particular candidates. General Singirok, having 
been removed from command of the PNGDF, had also campaigned for selected 
candidates in the highlands (specifically, a group of candidates, backed by 
Melanesian Solidarity, who had supported Singirok in his opposition to the 
Sandline contract). Consequently, in 2002, amidst talk of the PNGDF's being 
subjected to 'outside influences' (see, for example, The National 15 March 
2002, quoting PNGDF chief of Staff, Captain Ur Tom), it was decided that the 
army would be used in security operations during the national election only as a 
last resort, and troops were confined to barracks with leave cancelled. A change 
in the Defence portfolio, and announced changes in senior PNGDF positions 
early in 2002 (which were deferred after a legal challenge) were also seen as 
attempts to ensure the neutrality of the Defence Force in the lead-up to the 
election. (In April, however, it was reported that Defence Intelligence had 
informed the PNGDF commander, Commodore llau, that these changes were 
'election-related' and evidence of a plot by 'a major political party' to halt the 
retrenchment exercise and change the current conunand structure of the Force 
(The National 23 April 2002; also see The National 29 April 2002, 'Sir Michael 
[Somare] fears election rigging').) 
Notwithstanding these measures, it was reported in June that several soldiers, 
including a lieutenant colonel, had absented themselves and taken part in the 
election campaign. The civilian Defence secretary was also reported to have left 
his office and to have been seen with candidates in the highlands. Several 
soldiers were subsequently arrested in the Southern Highlands and charged with 
electoral offences. In July, as the law and order situation in the highlands 
deteriorated, preventing voting from taking place in much of the Southern 
Highlands (where 'failed elections' were eventually declared in six electorates), 
the PNGDF was deployed to assist the police. 
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The potential for a coup? 
The actions of disgruntled soldiers in September 2000 reflected a serious lack of 
discipline, but had only minor impact beyond the PNGDF itself. The 
confrontation at Murray Barracks in April 2001 was a more serious incident, 
though as I argued at the time, the action of the soldiers could be seen less as an 
'attempted coup', as some were apt to describe it, than as an indusuial dispute. 
Without downplaying the seriousness of any episode in which the disciplined 
forces defy an elected government (and recognizing that military coups are not 
infrequently prompted by soldiers seeking to safeguard their material interests), 
what was salient in April 2001 was that the rebellious soldiers did not go outside 
the barracks, and did not accept the invitation to join students and trade unionists 
in a more broadly-based protest. Their actions in 2001, indeed, were more 
constrained than in 1989, when soldiers marched on the National Parliament to 
protest their disappointment at lower-than-expected pay increases. 
Evidence of links between soldiers and serving or aspiring politicians, however, 
gives more substantial cause for concern. In recent years there have been 
persistent reports of PNGDF weapons being stolen, borrowed or hired by 
raskols, participants in intergroup fighting, and the sekuriti (bodyguards) of 
bigmen and politicians. There is also evidence that former raskols have been 
recruited into the PNGDF and that some discharged soldiers (often stiff living in 
the barracks) have been involved in raskol activity. In both the Murray Barracks 
and Moem mutinies, also, discharged soldiers were involved. 
Most observers (including myself) still believe that the probability of significant 
military intervention in politics in Papua New Guinea is very low. Not only do 
the small size of the Force, its lack of cohesion, the longstanding antipathy 
between the PNGDF and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, and the 
geography of the country all pose difficulties for potential coup makers,3 but, 
given the localized nature of political power in Papua New Guinea and the 
difficulties which even a legitimate government has in governing, it is difficult 
to envisage what those who carried a coup could do next. Nevertheless, the 
prospects of collaboration between disgruntled soldiers and opportunistic 
politicians to challenge an elected government can no longer be entirely ruled 
out. The Sandline affair, and the challenge to the government's implementation 
of the CEPG report and earlier proposals, have demonstrated to PNGDF 
personnel that a show of force can bring about a shift in government policy, and 
the emergence of factionalism within the Force, and factional links to 
' Though not, as former Papua New Guinea based army officer Trevor Rogers reminds me, insurmountable 
difficulties. 
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politicians, has created a climate in which military professionalism has been at 
least partially undermined. 
The appointment of a new commander in October 2001, and the withdrawal of 
troops from Bougainville following the signing of a Bougainville Peace 
Agreement the same year, provide an opportunity for the government and the 
PNGDF to address the problems of capability, morale and discipline in the 
Force, and to adapt the Force to the needs, and budgetary constraints, of the 
2000s. It has become clear, however, that if the decline in the professionalism 
of the PNGDF is to be halted and reversed, there needs to be a substantial 
change in the present culture of the Force. 
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